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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAI-1
INGA-LILL ELTON,
vs.

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

BANKERS LIFE &
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant and
Appellant.

Case No.
12993

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit on a group accident insurance policy covering State employees. The plaintiff, Inga-Lill
Elton, is the beneficiary of a $100,000.00 policy on
the life of the late Judge Leonard W. Elton and is
suing for the policy amount because of the alleged
accidental death of Leonard W. Elton on May 13,
1970.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried before a jury which returned
a verdict for plaintiff on April 12, 1972. Judgment
was entered on May 1, 1972, and defendant's Motion
For New Trial was denied by the Court on June 28,
1972.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a directed verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action brought by the plaintiff, IngaLill Elton, the beneficiary on a policy of insurance
designated as Special Risk Group Policy No. SR.
82508 issued to the State of Utah and covering the
employees of said State (R. 1 through R. 6). The
pertinent parts of the policy provide:
The Company certifies that the Employee
to whom this certificate is issued (hereinafter
called the Insured Person) is insured under
the above group policy against injury sustained by the Insured Person, or the Insured Person's dependents, if insured hereunder (hereinafter called Insured Dependents) . Coverage
is effective on the first day of the first month
for which premiums are paid through payroll
deductions as evidence by the records of the
Employer.
'Injury' wherever used in this certificate
means bodily injury occurring while the Group
Policy is in force as to the Insured Person or
Insured Dependent whose injury is the basis
of claim and causing the loss directly and independently of all other causes and effected solely through an accidental bodily injury to the
Insured Person or Insured Dependent.
BENEFICIARY
Loss, if any, as respects accidental death
only shall be payable to thP- person designated
2

in writing and on file with the Employer. If a
beneficiary designation has not been made then
loss will be payable to the Estate of the Insured
Person. All other indemnities are payable to
the Insured Person. The Employee will be the
Beneficiary of the dependents coverage.

* * * *

ACCIDENTAL DEATH, DISMEMBERMENT AND PERMANENT TOTAL
DISABLEMENT INDEMNITY
When injury to the Insured Person or Insured Dependent results in loss within One
Hundred and Eighty days after the date of the
accident the Company will pay, based on the
Principal Sum as stated in the Schedule and
applicable to the person whose injury is the
basis of claim, for
Loss of Life ________________ The Principal Sum
It is admitted by the defendant's Answer that

the plaintiff is the wife of the deceased, Leonard W.
Elton, who died on or about May 13, 1970, and is the
beneficiary designa:ted by the deceased pursuant to
the terms of the insurance policy referred to herein.
It is further admitted that said policy was in full
force and effect at the time Leonard W. Elton died
(R. 1-2 and 15). It is denied that Leonard W. Elton
died as a result of injury as that term is defined by
the policy (R.1and15).
Leonard W. Elton practiced law in Salt Lake
City since before World War II (R. 289). He was
appointed a District Judge in the Third Judicial District in 1966 (R. 172). On February 4, 1954, Leonard W. Elton went to Dr. Robert M. Dalrymple, a
3

specialist in internal medicine, for a routine physical
examination. As part of that examination an electrocardiogram was done which showed that Leonard
Elton had at some time prior suffered a heart attack.
He had damage to the heart muscle which, in the opinion of the doctor, was probably of long standing (R.
316). Dr. Dalrymple did not see Leonard Elton again
until he saw him in the St. Mark's Hospital on January 9, 1969. At that time Leonard Elton had been
admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital by one of the colleagues of the doctor and had suffered a stroke ( R.
319). Dr. Dalrymple's definition of a stroke was as
follows:
Something happens to a blood vessel. As a
result the blood supply is interrupted, and the
tissue dies, just like you tie a string around
your finger, it gets white and sore. This happens in the head. It all depends on what happens, if it hits a vulnerable area in the base of
the brain it will kill you instantly. If it hits
one side, it may affect and impair the other
side. It all depends on where this vessel is damaged in the head as to what happens. So briefly
a stroke is a damage to the nervous system.
(R. 316)
In his opinion Leonard Elton had suffered damage to the brain in the back of the head, that part
known as the cerebellum and the part which is concerned with balance (R. 320). Leonard Elton remained in the hospital until January 17, 1969. The
treatment consisted of trying to increase the blood
supply to his brain and keeping him from getting
4

complications, which would be pneumonia, paralysis,
trouble with the urinary tract and that sort of thing
( R. 320). As a result of the stroke Leonard Elton
suffered from emotional change and stress and had
difficulty balancing. He had no definite paralysis but
his speech was slow at times ( R. 322). After his release from the hospital, Dr. Dalrymple saw Leonard
Elton on March 4, 1969, at which time he was making
satisfactory progress. He was told to get rest and to
take a medication designed to increase blood supply
to his brain ( R. 322) . He was seen again on April
1, 1969, at which time Leonard Elton had returned
to part-time work. The doctor continued to see him
through the rest of the year during which time Leonard Elton apparently made satisfactory progress, returning to full-time employment on October 3, 1969
( R. 324). He was told to go ahead and do his work
as long as he was able to but if he got overtired or
overstressed to let the doctor know. On April 20, 1970,
Leonard Elton came into the doctor's office for an
eye infection and regular check-up at which time the
medicine for the circulation was reduced because he
seemed to be doing quite satisfactory. The next day,
April 21st, Leonard Elton's wife brought him back
into the office because he had suffered a sudden onset
of dizziness. He was cold and clammy and had an
astigmatism (blurred vision), which implies something wrong at the base of the brain. In the doctor's
opinion he had suffered another stroke. (R. 325).
The doctor suggested Leonard go to the hospital, but
he elected to stay home. Leonard suffered another
5

spell on the 28th of April (R. 326). At that time Dr.
Dalrymple did not see him but did change his medication because in his words, ''I knew he was in for
trouble." (R. 326). Dr. Dalrymple saw Leonard
again in the office on the 2nd of May, 1970. Dr. Dalrymple said he didn't have any definite localizing
signs that he had had a stroke in the sense that he
could tell just where it was but that he knew from his
behavior and attitude that something had happened
to him that wasn't good (R. 326). He saw him again
on the 9th of May, 1970, to check his condition, having heard from Leonard's wife that he had had some
trouble between the 2nd and 9th. He stated he was
surprised that Elton was in very good shape (R.
327). The next time Dr. Dalrymple saw him was on
May 13, 1970, at the St. Mark's Hospital. At that
time Leonard was unconscious, extremely weak,
sweating, blue, he had been sick, and his clinical picture was that of a terminal condition (R. 328). As
to his cause of death, the doctor defined the immediate cause as circulatory collapse which in turn was
caused by damage to his brain which in turn was
caused by the process which caused him to have the
stroke ( R. 329). In describing how this occurs, the
doctor testified :
Well, what happens is that people have
hard arteries, and when these arteries plug up
or get plugged, either something in the middle of the artery gets loose and flies in there
and plugs it off, or comes from some distant
point, or it could be infection such as we fl!-entioned with the stiff neck where the patient
6

might have had meningitis, which is something we had to consider, the vessels become
plugged, the series of events which I mentioned earlier, withuut the blood supply the tissue
died. In this case the tissue died. There was
swelling, the brain became swollen, pushed it
down in the little thing in the back of the neck,
and this caused the spinal cord to swell and all
the vital centers were just destroyed. ( R. 330).
After Leonard Elton's death, an autopsy was
done, the results of which were reviewed by Dr. Dalrymple. On the basis of that autopsy, Dr. Dalrymple
said that the heart attack in 1954 had been caused by
what is termed a "myocardial infarct" (R. 322),
which like the stroke had been brought about by the
progression of the arteriosclerosis to the point where
it had closed the artery leading to the heart, and that
part of the heart fed by that artery had actually died
( R. 333) . The doctor further found that clots had
been found in the spleen and the kidney which had also
been caused by small bodies traveling through the artery clogging the artery in the same manner as the
stroke ( R. 340) . He was of the opinion that the emboli which clogged the artery in the kidney and
spleen came from the heart (R. 342) but that in the
case of the stroke the emboli came off of the sides of
one of the blood vessels and traveled to the brain ( R.
342). As to the cause of the underlying condition of
arteriosclerosis, the doctor testified that the causes
of that condition are hereditary, diet, lack of exercise, and he further testified the personality of the
7

individual involved would be a contributing factor.
In that respect he said:
[A]n~ the group at the Zion Hospital in
San Francisco has done a lot of work in this.
In fact, there are a bunch of cardiologists in
Burbank who have made reports in the literature since 1969 about the effects of personality and stress and are saying that cholesterol
fatty acids of all kinds, tobacco, and certain of
these fat analysis we run now are not important, it is the personality the individual has
this effect. Some people smoke and get it, others don't. The same with alcohol (R. 336, 37).
He further testified that if a person had arteriosclerosis to the extent that Leonard Elton had it,
this is a continuing thing and the condition progresses (R. 342-343). From the time he saw Leonard Elton in January of 1969 until he died he never
released Leonard from his care ( R. 354-355) testifying that anybody who has a stroke is a sick person and
should be observed. He was afraid because of his personality that he might have another stroke, and he
hoped he could prevent one ( R. 355) . He realized
that the factor which had caused the stroke in 1969
was still present in his body, and he was likely to have
another stroke in the future. Given the conditions he
found at the autopsy and Leonard Elton's heart condition, it was surprising to him that he survived as
long as he did (R. 361).

District Judge Frank Wilkins testified that in
January of 1970 Leonard was appointed Presiding
Judge of the Third Judicial District. This position is
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a rotating position which is generally held for a six
month period by one of the ten judges assigned to the
District (R. 178). The position involved supervision
over the court calendar, assignments, personnel,
press matters, and the assignment of cases with constitutional issues or of great public interest ( R. 174) .
The judge usually worked from 8 :30 a.m. until 5 :00
p.m. each day (R. 174) and would frequently take
work home at night (R. 176). However, there is nothing unusual about the position. It is just part of being
a District Judge ( R. 182). Nor was there anything
unusual, according to Judge Wilkins, about judges
working from 8 :30 to 5 :00 (R. 182). In fact, the
position of the Presiding Judge has the advantage
that he can assign the difficult cases to another judge
(R. 185).
On March 26, 1970, another judge in the District
disqualified himself from a case known as the "Clark
Ronnow case" which involved a public official charged with the misuse of funds ( R. 197) . The matter
was referred to Judge Elton, as Presiding Judge, for
re-assignment. Mr. Ronnow had pleaded guilty to one
count; it was still necessary for a judge to impose sentence 'On this charge and rule on the District Attorney's Motion To Dismiss the other six counts of the
charge ('R. 201). A large amount of publicity accompanied all stages of the proceeding ( R. 202) . It was
customary for such cases to be transferred to a judge
from another Distirct (R. 205) but Judge Elton decided to handle the matter himself ( R. 204). During
9

the time that Judge Elton was associated with the case
he received telephone calls ( R. 204) which upset him
(R. 297). On April 6th Judge Elton held a one hour
hearing on the Ronnow case in which he passed sentence and dismissed the other six counts. He continued to receive harassing telephone calls on the Ronnow
case for approximately two weeks after the sentencing (R. 297).
Judge Elton also undertook to handle litigation
concerning the Sunday Closing Law which was filed
on April 6, 1970, and referred to Judge Elton :for assignment because it involved the constitutionality of
a law and attracted great public interest. The first
hearing was on April 16, 1970, in which one store
sought a temporary injunction against thirteen other
stores ( R. 245) , and it took one hour in court ( R.
246). Judge Elton consolidated all these Sunday
Closing Law cases for a hearing on the law's constitutionality. The Judge made himself available in
Chambers for consultation for four or five hours on
April 24th (Arbor Day, a State holiday) while the
attorneys decided on the best method for proceeding
with the case (R. 235). Judge Elton appeared drawn
and haggard and looked tired at a hearing on May 6,
1970 (R. 239). Newsmen and attorneys not formally connected with the case were frequently seeking
audiences with Judge Elton during this period of
time (R. 275). The Judge was also handling other
matters at this time (R. 276, 277). People who saw
10

Judge Elton daily testified that he seemed to be more
tired during the middle of April than he had previously been (R. 207, 227, 239, 254, 261, 269, 276,
289). In preparation for the case, Judge Elton
started spending evenings and weekends researching
the constitutionality of Sunday Closing Laws, and
was also skipping his lunches to conduct research.
The plaintiff, Inga-Lill Elton, wife of Leonard
W. Elton, was not aware of Dr. Dalrymple's finding
that Leonard Elton had had a heart attack prior to
1954 ( R. 307) and testified that he had had good
health up until the time of his first stroke in January
of 1969 ( R. 293). After that stroke she testified that
his health appeared to improve until April of 1970,
although he did have some impairment but he had
really started to overcome this ( R. 295). On April
21, 1970, he complained of dizzy spells, a:t which point
she took him to the doctor who told Leonard that he
was working too hard and that he would have to slow
down (R. 299). On April 28th he had a real dizzy
spell. Upon the advice of Dr. Dalrymple he stayed
home for the rest of that week. On the evening of May
5, 1970, the Judge went to bed early and Mrs. Elton
found him staring blankly when she looked in on him
at 11 :00 p.m. Mrs. Elton found that he had completely lost his memory. She and their children talked to
him until about 3 :00 o'clock a.m. when Mrs. Elton
gave him a sleeping pill on Dr. Dalrymple's advice
and put him to bed ( R. 302, 303) . The Judge had ref ained his memory when he woke up the next morn11

ing ( R. 303). He went to court and heard oral arguments on the Sunday Closing Law from 10 :00
a.m. until 12 :00 noon and then from 2 :00 p.m.
until 5 :00 p.m. (R. 238. Six briefs had previously been submitted to the Judge (R. 236)
on this matter. According to an attorney who participated, Judge Elton seemed alert and asked intelligent questions during the morning session but
looked tired, asked few questions, and his mind seem
ed to wander in the afternoon (R. 239). Pursuant to
the doctor's orders Judge Elton stayed home for the
rest of the week (R. 304). On May 12th Judge Elton
appeared very tired to his wife (R. 305) and the two
attorneys who dealt with him (R. 240, 290). He made
a one-sentence announcement of his decision on the
Sunday Closing Law ( R. 240), handled two default
divorces, and spent the rest of the day trying a boundary dispute ( R. 279). The stroke occurred at 8 :30
a.m. the following morning, and Judge Elton was
rushed to the St. Mark's Hospital where he died at
approximately 10 :45 a.m. (R. 328).
Mrs. Elton further testified that in each instance
Judge Elton's difficulty occurred while he was relaxed or resting. The stroke in January of 1969 occurred
in the evening ( R. 308). The Judge had come home
from work and had said he was very tired and had
gone to bed. He had suffered a stroke when she returned from the store about 8 :30 or 9 :00 p.m.
The stroke of April 21st (or dizzy spell as Mrs.
Elton chose to call it) occurred at 9 :00 o'clock in the
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morning following a period when Judge Elton had
had a night's rest (R. 309); and on May 5th when
the Judge appeared disoriented, this occurred at 3 :00
a.m. after the Judge had been in bed for some time;
and the final stroke of May 13, 1970, occurred after
the Judge had had a full night of sleep and had decided to stay home from work for an extra hour. None
of these episodes occurred following a time of excitement when the Judge was aroused or doing any physical exertion or anything of that nature and from
sometime in April going on until the time of his death
Judge Elton appeared to be getting more and more
tired and dragging ( R. 312) and gray and ashen.
He became more withdrawn and moody and toward
the end (according to Mrs. Elton) was really ragged
(R. 313). Following Judge Elton's death, on May 14,
1970 an autorsy was performed at the St. Mark's Hospital by Drs. Robert Stewart and Shelley A. Swift.
Dr. Swift, a Board Certified pathologist, was called
as a witness. He testified that pathology is mainly the
study of causation of disease and mechanisms producing death ( R. 424) and that the primary purpose
of performing an autopsy is to determine the cause
of death (R. 425). In Judge Elton's case he found a
healed infarction of the heart with an aneurysm formation, emphysema and congestion in his lungs, a
healed infarct in the spleen, a healed infarct in the
kidneys, and evidence of an old and recent infarction
in the brain ( R. 427). He also had general arteriosclerosis involving most of the vessels including the
aorta, the heart and the brain. In addition, stones
13

were found in his gall bladder. He defined an infarct
as an obstruction in one of the arteries leading to an
organ, as a result of which the area supplied by the
artery will die as a result of lack of oxygen and nutrition. He defined an aneurysm as a dilatation and
went on to say:
... And in the heart, when you have an
infarct there, the heart is continually under
pressure as the heart contract. And since the
wall is weak, every time the heart contracts,
there is a tendency for this scar tissue to
stretch. And over a period of years the scar
tissue will stretch and form a sac of scar tissue
which is called an aneurysm of the heart. (R.
427).
As to the effect this will have on the circulation,
he testified :
Well, whenever you have an aneurysm
present, the contracting of the heart is extremely inefficient, because the part of the
heart that's involved by the aneurysm cannot
contract, and therefore all of the blood that is
in the aneurysmal sac stays there with each
contraction rather than being expelled out as a
normal heart would do, only part of the blood
in the heart is expelled, and part remains with
each contraction, so that it is very inefficient
contraction.
He defined arteriosclerosis as a process which
takes place in the arteries primarly involving the deposition of fat substances in the wall of the artery. In
addition, there is a calcification which is considered
secondary. The primary change is the deposition of
14

fat in the wall of the artery (R. 428). In Judge Elton's case this condition was most marked in the heart
and the brain. We further find this as a progressive
sort of disease ( R. 429) . As to the cause, he testified:
Well, the entire cause isn't known forcertain, but there are many things known to predispose arteriosclerosis. In the first place, arteriosclerosis involves everybody to some extent, but many people it is very mild and
causes no trouble until quite late in life. But in
many people it occurs quite early in life, and
these people have a metabolic abnormality of
the fat metabolism which predisposes to deposition of this lipid material in the arteries. So
probably the most important cause is heredity.
If you are born with a defect in fat metabolism,
this is probably the most important single
cause of it.
The next most important cause is diet itself. And diet in a person that is not involved
with a metabolic defect has relatively little effect on arteriosclerosis. But if you have a diabetic - I mean a metabolic defect, then diet is
extremely important, and predisposes to arteriosclerosis. There are some other factors that
tend to aggravate it like high blood pressure
tends to promote arteriosclerosis, but these are
the chief factors. ( R. 429 and 430).

1'

In Dr. Swift's opinion there was no question that
Judge Elton, having had a heart attack at 43 years of
age, had a metabolic defect and that this was one of
the causes of his condition. In his opinion the immediate cause of Leonard Elton's death was cerebral infarction or stroke. The occlusion caused a large area
15

of the brain to lose its vitality and cease to function,
and this together with the swelling of the tissues
around the involved area produced death involving
the vital centers. As to the source of the emboli which
caused the occlusion in Judge Elton's case, the witness testified it could have formed in the heart and
traveled to the brain, or it could have formed in the
vessel which supplied the area. He further
testified that the under 1 yin g cause of
both the heart condi ti on and the stroke or cerebral infarct was the underlying condition of
arteriosclerosis. He testified that a person
with the condition found in Leonard Elton's heart
would become progressively more prone to thrombosis because of more inefficiency in circulation and
that when it reached a point of shock there would be
poor oxygenation in the blood, the person would be
ashen in color and would tend to be tired ( R. 436) .
As to whether or not stress might cause injury, the
doctor testified that it would depend upon whether
or not the stress was pathologic stress. Anything
which will produce fear will produce stress. The reason for this is that the body has built in a
reaction to protect the body aginst harm. So
any type of psychologic stress which produces
stress reaction, shock, anything that will produce shock like blood loss, burns, physical trauma,
damage to the tissue, this produces pathologic stress
reaction (R. 438). Increased physical activity does
not produce a pathologic stress reaction nor would an
16

increased work load produce an injury to the organs
of the body (R. 439 and 440). The fact that Leonard
Elton was acting as Presiding Judge, trying lawsuits, and handled some sensitive matters would not,
in the doctor's opinion, produce pathologic stress.
The plaintiff produced Dr. Clyde Null whose
specialty was internal medicine and cardiovascular
disease. He did not see Judge Elton personally but
testified upon the basis of the hospital records, including the autopsy report ( R. 364, 365). He testified that Judge Elton had had a previous myocardial
infarct, an infarct in the spleen, one in the kidney
and in the brain and although the emboli which caused the particular infarct may have come from different sources, either the wall of a vessel or the heart itself ( R. 380) , the mechanics of injury in each instance were the same, that of tissue dying as a result
of an inadequate blood supply to that particular piece
of tissue ( R. 381). At one point in the record he felt
the basic cause of Leonard Elton's death was cerebral
vascular disease (R. 389) resulting in a cerebral vascular accident (R. 388) which he defined as:
It is a steady progression of disease which
is altered by certain factors as was stated. The
common medical term for this is a cerebral vascular accident.
He at one point in the record did state that the
work which Leonard Elton was doing at the time of
his death would markedly aggravate his cerebral vascular disease ( R. 377). He explained this by saying:
There is a great wealth of clinical infor17

mation to indicate that individuals who have
arteriosclerosis who are placed under chronic
stress tend to do - tend to have a much increased risk of having strokes, heart attacks,
and that sort of thing, simply from the fact
that stress aggravates arteriosclerosis. There
is excellent medical information to indicate
this on a variety of principles involved, not
necessarily just in producing a blood clot, but
changing the basic blood flow patterns, changing the oxygen requirements. Strokes are not
just the consequence of a blocked blood vessel,
they are the consequence of many, many little
factors involved in the tissue and alteration in
the basic tissue requirements for oxygen. And
that's basically what the blood does, it takes
oxygen and foodstuff to the brain for it to
survive on. But various other factors are involved, and they are all altered by stress. Our
bodies are such that this is a fact of life. And
there is little question that individuals subjected to harrassment, stress, who are ill because
of pre-existing strokes, heart attacks, what
have you, or just arteriosclerosis anywhere
will be made worse by this type of activity.
However, in arriving at even this limited opinion, the doctor was unaware that the only court hearing Judge Elton had had in the Clark Ronnow case
lasted from fifteen minutes to a maximum of an hour
(R. 385) and that the total court time he spent on the
Sunday Closing Law was a total of ten hours over a
period of three separate days ( R. 385) . He further
admitted that all persons are subject to such stress in
the ordinary affairs of life (R. 386), worry about
their family, and in Judge Elton's case stress brought
18

about by the fact that he had been having strokes (R.
387). He further admitted that the stress arises not
so much out of the nature of the work being performed as the personality of the individual called type A
personality traits and type B personality traits (R.
394) :
. . . Type A being very agressive, hard
working, striving to meet the deadline type of
individual, and whom you can demonstrate
without any question they have a very marked
affinity for vascular disease. Type B being an
individual who is more sedentary, who is less
agressive, and they exclude things like you
can't - people admitted to this study, they
don't have diabetes, they don't have high blood
pressure, the only factors different are life
styles, and everything else being about the
same, as close as can be determined. . . . ( R.
394, 395).
Dr. Chester Powell, a physician specializing in
neurologic surgery including injuries to the brain
brought about by some kind of a vascular condition
(R. 463 and 464) gave his opinion as to the cause of
Leonard Elton's death on May 13th as follows:
The evidence of Dr Dalrymple's observations, treating the patient, the hospital records
and the autopsy report would indicate that
Judge Elton suffered from a progressive disorder of the blood vessels called athrosclerosis
or arteriosclerosis; more simply hardening of
the arteries. This involved the arteries not only
of the heart, but the arteries of the brain. The
heart showed evidence of past disease, past
heart attacks and complications in the anatomy of the heart as a result. The blood vessels
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of the brain showed hardening with thickening
of their walls, so as to decrease the opening or
the channel through which the blood passed,
and produced a complete obstruction on the
right side resulting in an area - a large area
of the brain failing to receive its blood supply.
This area is called in medical terms an infarct.
The tissue of the brain having lost its blood
supply actually dies. The extent of this damage to the brain was such that it led to Judge
Elton's death. ( R. 465, 466).
As to whether or not there was anything unusual about Judge Elton's death on May 13, 1970, he
testified:
... This was a chronic disease which slowly progresses, producing various complications
and problems incident to its effect on the blood
supply in areas of the body where the arteries
are involved. This con di tion tends to progress,
and patients die in time unless some intercurrent illness or accident occurs from one of the
common complications of the disease as it effects either the heart, the brain or the kidney,
or some other vital organ. The evidence in the
autopsy and in - otherwise concerning Judge
Elton's health would indicate this was a chronic disorder which was in process for a period of
at least years, with this ultimate outcome to be
expected.
I don't think there was anything unusual
or out of the ordinary at all that he expired of
brain complications of the disease. Perhaps the
only unusual thing is with an aneurysm of that
size in his heart, that this hadn't ruptured and
caused his death before he died of the cerebral
complications. (R. 467, 468).
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In response to a hyp<Jthetical question asked of
Dr. Powell in regard to whether or not the work load
and the other stress which Judge Elton was under at
the time of his death caused his death, Dr. Powell testified:
I don't think this could be considered,
from what we know of the disease and how it
- how the disease produced Judge Elton's
death, a factor in the immediate occurrence of
his death. I don't think that the tension or work
load could be considered a proximate cause of
death. We know only that stress and tension
have some general effect on the occurrence of
arteriosclerosis. It is a medical hypothesis or
theory. There is no reliable medical scientific
evidence confirming this. And if it does have
an effect, it is a chronic effect exerted over a
period of years.
Had Judge Elton died of a cerebral hemorrhage which could have been attributed to a
marked rise in blood pressure, then I think we
could have said that immediate tensions, work
loads, stress, could conceivably have played a
significant role in the death occurring under
those circumstances. In this situation, I don't
think that stress or strain had any immediate
or specific effect on the outcome and course of
the disease.
Although Dr. Chester Powell did not treat Leonard Elton, he did have occasion to see him on a few
occasions prior to his death. In response to questions
by the plaintiff's attorney, he testified as follows:
A. I recollect seeing him on two or three occasions in this court building, and once or
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twice on the street. I did not examine him
on any of those occasions.
Q. Well, you wouldn't purport to give any diagnosis of what was wrong with him from
those observations?
A. No, except that it was apparent that he was
probably a chronically ill gentleman, and
tha:t changes were occurring. What they
were, I couldn't have said simply from
these observations.
Q. When you say chronically ill, ill of what?
A. I could see that he had lost weight, that
there was a change in his posture and gait,
and I wondered if he might not have some
chronic disorder. For one thing, the characteristic of his gait suggested to me that
he might have cerebral vascular disease.
Q. Now did I understand you to say that in
answer to counsel's question that you could
expect Judge Elton's death on May 13th at
9 :30 in the morning?
A. I think we would have anticipated that
death was imminent, and would have occurred from complications of his vascular
disease, not that it would occur at any specific time or date; that it did occur at that
time I think was consistent with what we
know of his physical con di ti on. ( R. 473,
474).
From the question of what role stress may have
played in Leonard Elton's death, the doctor testified
i.n response to questions by plaintiff's attorney:
A. My opinion would be that stress sustained
over a period of years, according to present
medical evidence, probably played some
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role, how much or how little, it would be
impossible to say, in the development of
his arteriosclerosis; generally probably
played a rather specific role in the occurrence of the heart attack. But I don't think
it would play any role in the occurence of
the infarct.
Q. No matter how serious that stress was, or
how unusual?
A. Not an immediate and direct cause and effect role. Over years, it might have had
some - played some role in the development of the arterosclerosis. (R. 476, 477).
POINT I.
THE POLICY IN THE PRESENT CASE CLEARLY REQUIRES THAT THE INSURED MUST
DIE AS A RESULT OF AN ACCIDENTAL
BODILY INJURY.

that:

The policy involved in the present case states

The Company certifies that the Employee
to whom this certificate is issued ... is insured
under the above group policy against injury
sustained by the Insured Person ...
·'Injury' wherever used in this certificate
means bodily injury occurring while the Group
Policy is in force as to the Insured Person ...
whose injury is the basis of claim and causing
the loss directly and independently of all other
causes and effected solely through an accidental bodily injury to the Insured Person . . .
(Emphasis added)
The policy in the present case clearly contains
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the word "accidental," which is sufficient to require
proof that the insured died an accidental death. Any
construction to the contrary is clearly erroneous since
it is in direct contravention of past decisions of this
Court and sound rules of construction.
The past decisions of this Court clearly indicate
that the word "accidental" in the insuring clause is
sufficient to establish that an insurance policy only
covers injuries caused by accident. In Richards v.
Standard Accident Insurance Company, 58 Utah 622,
200 P. 1017 ( 1921), relied on by plaintiff in her trial
memorandum, the Court considered a policy which
insured against
( L) oss resulting from bodily injuries effected directly, exclusively and independently
of all other causes, through accidental means
... Id. at 1018.
The Court held that the beneficiary of the insurance policy could recover where the insured, a mining
engineer, died from sunstroke in the desert while returning from a trip on foot to a mining prospect,
which was represented to him as being only six instead of ten miles distant; such misrepresentation or
miscalculation of distance being an accidental, unexpected, or unseen event. In doing so the court held
that the plaintiff must prove that the death was acciidental. The court relied on the words "accidental
means" since there was apparently no disease exclusion in the policy. The court said:
If the sunstroke in the present case was
not, in and of itself, an accidental means, as we
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think it was, it, nevertheless, according to the
undisputed evidence, resulted from accidental
means or an accidental cause. An 'accidental
means' is a means or a cause that is unexpected, unforeseen, and fortuitous; it is an accidental event, unexpected and unforseeable, an
occurrence that is unexpected and unforeseen.
The authorities generally hold that death
or injury does not result from accident or accidental means within the terms of an accident
insurance policy where the injury or death is
the natural and probable result of the insured's
voluntary act unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the dea:th or injury. The authorities cited by appellant in support of this
proposition may be found in 7 A.L. R. 1131,
1132, and I.C.J. 427-429. However, it is a wellestablished exception to the above rule that
where death or injury is not the natural and
probable result of a voluntary and intentional
act by the insured, or something unforeseen or
unexpected or unusual occurs in the act which
precedes the injury, then the injury is the result of accidental means. Supporting this proposition numerous authorities are cited by the
annotator in 7 A.L.R. 1132, 1133. The leading
case on the subject is that of United States v.
Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 9 Sup. Ct. 755, 33 L. Ed.
60, in which it is held:
"The term 'accidental' was used in the
policy in its ordinary popular sense, as meaning, 'happening by chance; unexpectedly taking place; not according to the usual course of
things; or not as expected'; that, if a result is
such as fallows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by
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accidental means; but that if, in the act which
precedes the injury, something- unforeseen, unexpected, unusual occurs which produces the
injury, then the injury has resulted through
accidental means."
In Western Commercial Travelers' Ass'n v. Smith, 85 Fed. 401, 29 C.C.A. 223, 40
L.R.A. 653, Judge Sanborn gives a clear definition of 'accidental means' as follows:
"'The significance of this word ''accidental' is best perceived by a consideration of the
relation of causes to their effects. The word
is descriptive of means which produce effects
which are not their natural and probable consequences. The na:tural consequence of means
used in the consequence which ordinarily follows from their use - the result which may be
reasonably anticipated from their use, and
which ought to be expected. The probable consequence of the use of given means is the consequence which is more likely to follow from
their use than it is to fail to follow. An effect
which is the natural and probable consequence
of an act or course of action is not an accident,
nor is it produced by accidental means. It is
either the result of actual design, or it falls under the maxim that every man must be held to
intend the na:tural and probable consequence
of his deeds. On the other hand, an effect which
is not the natural or probable consequence of
the means which produced it, an effect which
does not ordinarily follow and cannot be reasonably anticipated from the use of these
means, an effect which the actor did not intend
to produce, and which he cannot be charged
with the design of producing under the maxim
to which we have adverted, is produced by accidental means. It is produced by means which
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were neither designed nor calculated to cause
it. Such an effect is not the result of design,
cannot ?e reasonably anticipated, is unexpected, and is produced by an unusual combination
of fortuitous circumstances; in other words
it is produced by accidental means." Id. at
1022, 1023.
In Thompson v. American Casualty Company,
20 Utah 2d 418, 439 P.2d 276 (1968) the Court again
required a showing of accidental death when the only
policy language relied on was the simple phrase "accidental means." Id. at 419.
Since this Court has repeatedly held that the
phrase "accidental means" is sufficient to require the
plaintiff to show that the insured's death was '''accidental," it is important to dispel the notion that this
phrase has any greater significance than the phrases
"accidental bodily injury" or '''accidental result."
This was done over 25 years ago by Justice Wolfe in
Handley v. Mutiwl Life Insurance Company of New
York, 106 Utah 184, 147 P.2d 319, 152 A.L.R. 1278
(1944), in which the insured had been operated on
for a hernia. The operation was an apparent success
but the patient died three weeks later of a pulmonary
embolism caused by a blood clot which had formed
behind the site of the operation. The beneficiary sued
for recovery on the theory that the formation of this
clot was an unusual, unforeseen and unexpected result of such an operation since proper operating procedures had been followed and no apparent mishaps
had occurred during the operation. The policy requir27

ed that the insured die from "accidental means." In
affirming the verdict for plaintiff, the Court interpreted the phrase "accidental means" and rejected
the defendant's contention that this language required the cause of the injury (i.e. the operation) to be
unexpected or unforeseen. Justice Wolfe said :
. . . This court has definitely gone on record as construing the provision under discussion and equivalent provisions as reaching
cases where the death or disablement is the
unexpected result, intended acts making the
result itself, rather than the means, the accident. Id at 191, 14 7 P.2d 322.
The net result of these two cases is to require the
plaintiff to prove that the injury or death of the insured was accidental in that it was brought about by
an unexpected event or is not the natural and probable consequence of the means which produced it, an
effect which does not ordinarily follow and cannot be
reasonably anticipated from the event.
It is clear that, for 25 years, Utah law has made

no distinction between the phrases "bodily injury effected solely through ... accidental means" and "bodily injury effected solely through an ... accidental
event." Under Utah decisions these phrases clearly
had the same legal effect. In the present case the policy states that the insured must die from "an accidental bodily injury." This is synonymous with the
phrase "accidental event" since a bodily injury is obviously an "event." Therefore, the three phrases mentioned in the above paragraph clearly have the same
28

legal significance and clearly require the beneficiary
to prove that the decedent died from an "accident."
For 25 years there has been no ambiquity about
the meaning of the word '''accident" in Utah law.
There was no ambiquity about its meaning when this
policy was written and sold to Utah State employees.
The law interpeting the policy language used in this
policy should not be changed after the parties have
relied on that law in drafting the policy.
The plaintiff also contends that the word '''accident" must be construed strictly against the insurer.
However, in Handley, supra, this Court stated that
an insurance contract should only be construed
against the insurer when it contains ambiguities. Id.
at 1282. In light of the extensive Utah law defining
the word "accident," it was not ambiguous when it
was inserted in the policy involved in the present case.
In the present case the insurer obviously intended to restrict recovery to situations where the decedent died from '''accidental" dea:th. The Court should
not change the contract after it has been written.
Couch on Insurance, 2d, Section 15 :37 says:
It is the duty of the courts in interpreting
insurance contracts to enforce and carry out
the contract which the parties have made,
without importing anything into the contract
by construction contrary to its express terms,
or the plain meaning of its terms, or attempting to make a better or different contract....
Plaintiff relies heavily on the differences in the
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language between the insurance contract in the present case and the '''classical accident policy." There
are several clauses sometimes found in accident policies which were absent from Judge Elton's policy.
There was no requirement that the cause of injury
be "external and violent;" also, there was no exclusion specifically barring recovery from deaths contributed to partially by disease. Plaintiff than argues
that, because the policy lacks these clauses, the clause
requiring that the injury be accidental is somehow
rendered ineffective. The fallacy of this argument is
obvious. 'These clauses are separable, and the absence
of one clause does not weaken the effect of the others.
The requirement of "accidental bodily injury" is in
the policy and cannot be eliminated by strictissimi
juris or any other doctrine the plaintiff may rely on.
The presence of the accidental bodily injury requirement in the policy is even more compelling in light of
the fact that so many of the other elements of the
classical accident policy were omitted.
In interpreting the contract in the present case,
plaintiff relies heavily on the absence of a clause specifically excluding disease. Because of the absence of
this clause, the plaintiff claims that:
Since the policy in the case at bar contained no exclusion concerning the type of injury
that plaintiff died from, the law is clear that
it is no defense to claim that tqe death would
have occurred ultimately, even without the accident or to claim that it was a disease or dis30

ability which ultimately caused the death. (R.
128).
This over-states the effect of the absence of the
specific disease exclusion. Two different interpretations have been made on the effect of this language.
First, absent such an exclusion, the courts have held
that recovery may be denied under this language if
an insured died from a disease which was so chronic
and progressive that it could be expected to be a
source of mischief. In McMartin v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 264 N.Y. 220, 190 N.E. 415
(1934) the decedent was insured "against disability
or death resulting directly and independently of all
other causes, from bodily injuries sustained through
external, violent and accidental means." 'The insured
had suffered from chronic and progressive nephritis
(an inflammation of the kidneys) when he was involved in an automobile accident which caused rib
damage. Although the pain subsided after five or six
days, the insured died of nephritis twenty days after
the accident. Id. 415. In affirming the judgment for
defendant by the trial court, the appellate court construed the policy and said :
[I] t is appropriate to paraphrase as follows a recent statement of the rule by Mr. Justice Cardozo: Under a policy phrased as this
one, the 1nsurer may be relieved of liability if
an idiosyncratic condition of mind or body predisposing the insured to injury is so acute as to
constitute a disease.... (Justice Cardozo said
in his dissenting opinion in a prior case that)
The disease or the infirmity must be so consid31

erable or significant that it would be characterized as disease or infirmity in the common
speech of men ... of such quality or degree
that in its natural and probable development
it may be expected to be a source of mischief.
Id. at 415.
In applying the language of that policy to the
facts of that particular case, the court said:
Nephritis existent for at least three years,
chronic and progressive, may not with any fitness of language or with any sense of reality
be described as a mere predisposing tendency.
It is a condition which in its natural and probable development may be expected to ·be a
source of mischief, and so a disease; and if it
were mentioned as inflammation of the kidneys instead as of nephritis, the ordinary man
in his common speech would unquestionably
call it a disease. Id. at 416.
The nub of defendant's contention on this point
is that, although the policy in the present case lacks
a specific disease exclusion it still requires that the
death be accidental. Therefore, the plaintiff may not
recover under a policy containing this language when
the disease is the primary cause of death.
Second, even if the interpretation pressed by the
plaintiff is accepted, the accident is still required to
be the primary cause of death before recovery can be
granted under an accident policy which lacks a disease exclusion. In Couch on Insurance, 2d, Section
41 :380 it says:
There is a distinction between an accident
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policy covering loss ''resulting directly, independently and exclusively" from other causes
and a similar policy containing the additional
phrase excluding disabiilty "wholly or in part,
directly or indirectly, from disease or other
bodily infirmities," or phrases of like nature.
The phrase "resulting directly, independently
and exclusively" refers to the efficient, substantial, and proximate cause of the disability
at the time it occurs. On the other hand, a policy containing the additional phrase set out
above refers to another contributory cause,
whether proximate or remote. Where, under a
policy containing only the first phrase, the accidental injury acts upon a pre-existing disease causing total disability which except for
such disease would not have occurred, the injury is deemed to be the proximate cause of the
disability entitling recovery. But it is otherwise where the policy contains the additional
phrase indicated above. Of course, the result
would be otherwise in this latter situation
where the disease resulted from the accidental
injury or if the accidental injury caused the
disablement independently of the disease. Otherwise stated, where the policy covers accidental death resulting directly and independenUy of all other causes through external,
violent, and accidental means, liability arise.;;
if the accident is the movinq, sole, and proximate cause of death, even though a pre-existing disease or physical infirmity is a necessary
condition to the result. However, where the insurer's liability is further restricted by a
clause avoiding liabiilty where death results
directly or indirectly from disease or from bodily or mental infirmity, it is not sufficient to
create liability to establish a direct casual rela33

tion between the accident and the death or disability, but the plaintiff must show that the
resulting condition was caused solely by external and accidental means, if the evidence points
to a pre-existing infirmity or abnormality
which may have been a contributing factor, the
burden is upon him to produce further evidence to exclude this possibility. (Emphasis
added)
Therefore, it is clear that the authorities require
that the plaintiff, as a prerequisite to recovery under
the policy language in this case, must prove that Leonard Elton died as a result of an accidental bodily
injury in the sense that the event which produced the
injury was in itself unforeseen and unexpected or,
if not, the results of the event must be the unnatural
or improbable consequence of the means which produced it, an effect which does not ordinarily flow and
cannot be reasonably anticipated from the means or
event. The plaintiff overstates the law when she
claims that'' ... it is no defense to claim that the death
would have occurred ultimately, even without the accident or to claim that it was a disease or disability
which ultimately caused the death." (R. 128). This
is misleading because under either policy it must be
proven that the accident is the moving, sole, and proximate cause of death, even though a pre-existing disease or physical infirmity is a necessary condition to
that result.
POINT II.
AS A MATTER OF LAW, JUDGE ELTON'S
DEATH WAS NOT ACCIDENTAL AND BE-
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CA USE IT WAS FORESEEABLE AND NOT
UNEXPECTED.

As has been seen from the authorities cited under Point I, the plaintiff has the burden of proving in
this case that Leonard Elton died as a result of an accidental bodily injury. This burden could have been
met by proving that an unexpected event occurred
which produced the injury. However, if the event itself is not unexpected, the plaintiff would be required
to prove that the injury was the unexpected result
of the intended act. In this case the plaintiff relies
upon the evidence that Judge Elton was acting as
Presiding Judge of the Third Judicial District and
was handling the case of a public official charged
with the misuse of funds and a question involving the
constitutionality of the Sunday Closing Law.
There is no element of chance, unexpectedness
or accident about a judge voluntarily undertaking to
act as Presiding Judge or to try cases involving constitutional issues or public officials. If we assume,
for the purpose of argument, that the stress and
strain Leonard Elton was under at the time of his
death had something to do with contributing to the
cause of his death, the evidence failed to meet the burden of proof because it failed to show that his death or
injury was not the natural and probable result of a
voluntary and intentional act of Judge Elton.
In Richards v. Standard Accident Insurance
Company, supra, the court allowed recovery on two
grounds: First, that the trip was 8 miles longer than
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the insured had anticipated and, second, that the sunstroke was an unusual event in an arid climate. This
is the first case in which the court stated that death
or injury from a voluntary act can be an accident.
The court stated clearly that a death or injury was
"accidental" when it was the unforeseen and unexpected result of an act, regardless of whether the act
was accidental or voluntarily committed by the insured.
This test for accident has subsequently been applied by this court on numerous occasions. In Whatcott v. Continental Casualty Company, 85 Utah 406,
39 P.2d 733 ( 1935) the insured was protected
against "loss of life ... resulting from a personal bodily injury which is effected solely and independently
of all other causes by happening of an external, violent and purely accidental event." Id. at 734. Novocain was injected into the insured's spine as an anesthetic during a routine appendectomy. Unknown to
the insured or his doctors, he suffered from a hypersusceptibili ty to novocain and died on the operating
table when his body's reaction to the drug caused
respiratory failure. The court reversed the verdict
for the defendant in the trial court and remanded for
new trial. The trial court held that this could be an
accidental death because the involuntary acts of submitting to the incision or the anesthetic resulted in
an unexpected and unforeseen result, the insured's
death.
The rule is again applied in Handley v. Mutvnl
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Life Imurance Company of New York, 106Utah184,
147 P.2d 319 ( 1944), in which the insured had a life
insurance policy which had a provision which provided double indemnity if "the insured died as a direct result of bodily injury effected solely through external,
violent and accidental means, independently and exclusively of all other causes ... " Id. at 187, 14 P.2d
at 320. The insured suffered a hernia when a steel
bar hit him in the groin. The routine operation was
subsequently performed to repair the hernia and
there was no deviation from standard operating procedures. Nineteen days after the operation the insured died from a pulmonary embolism caused by a
blood clot which had formed behind the operation site.
The formation of this clot was an unusual occurrence.
The court affirmed the trial court's decision for the
plaintiff.
In Kellogg v. California Western States Life Insurance Company, 114 Utah 567, 201 P.2d 949
( 194 9) the insured was covered under a policy which
protected against "bodily injury ... which is effected
exclusively and wholly by external, violent and accidental means, of which there is a visible contusion or
wound on the body ... " Id. at 950. This was the
double indemnity clause of a life insurance policy.
There was also a specific clause excluding death resulting "directly or indirectly, from ... physical or
mental infirmity ... illness or disease of any kind ... ''
Id. at 950. The insured had been operated on in 1944
for a perforated duodenal ulcer and, immediately af37

ter the operation, he suffered shock and was in critical condition. He recevored, and in 1945 underwent an
·operation for ventral hernia which apparently developed from the first operations. He was an extremely
muscular man and in making the incision the surgeon
discovered 17 adhesions which greatly prolonged the
time required to perform the operation. The operation took six hours and the insured suffered from loss
of blood and body fluid, but there were no unusual
occurrences. Within eight hours after the second operation the insured was in post-operative shock and
he died the next day. The court affirmed the trial
court's finding that the death was not accidental. It
said that the post-operative shock and ensuing death
were foreseeable in light of the insured's history of
post-operative shock one year before and the 17 adhesions which the surgeon found after he anesthetized
the patient and started the second operation.
Therefore, in the Handley and Whatcott cases
this court held the death to be accidental when there
was no prior medical history which would indicate
that the insured might suffer injury resulting in
death from his voluntary act in submitted to the operation. However, this court has refused to hold that
a death was accidental when the insured\~ prior medical history and the medical discoveries made by the
surgeon at the time of the operation indicated that
the type of injury that the insured suffered from was
not unexpected.
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Under this test, Leonard Elton's death on May
13, 1970, was clearly not an "accident" in light of Dr.
Powell's statement that he looked like a man with
cerebral vascular insufficiency several weeks before
his death, Mr. Harold Waldo's statement that Judge
Elton looked very tired on the afternoon of May 6th
and Dr. Dalrymple's statements that Judge Elton
suffered from a stroke on April 21st (R. 325), acerebral vascular incident on April 28th (R. 326) and
loss of memory on May 5th (R. 302, 303). Also, Dr.
Dalrymple stated that he increased Judge Elton's
medication on April 28th because '~I knew he was in
trouble" ( R. 326), and the doctor suggested on April
21st that the Judge go into the hospital (R. 325). In
light of this extensive history of cerebral vascular
trouble in the weeks before his death, the fatal stroke
on May 13, 1970, was not unexpected and, therefore,
not an accident.
Taking the testimony of the plaintiff's expert,
Dr. Clyde Null, in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and it must be remembered that he did not
testify that the stress which Leonard Elton was under at the time of his death caused his death but simply that it may have markedly aggravated his basic
disease, the purport of his testimony seems to be that
persons who are placed under chronic stress, or, that
is, stress for a long period of time, have an increased
risk of having strokes and heart attacks, simply
from the fact that stress aggravates arteriosclerosis.
This is simply to say that the natural and probable re39

sult of the stress which Leonard Elton may have been
under at the time of his death is that it would aggra~
vate his basic disease of arteriosclerosis; or in other
words, the natural and probable result of a man with
the basic condition of Leonard Elton subjecting himself to stress is that it will aggravate his basic condition. To put it in a common vernacular, if a person as
sick as Leonard Elton was voluntarily subjects himself to a heavy work load, the natural, probable and
foreseeable result is that his condition would be worse
than if the stayed home and rested and that he might
die from that condition sooner than if he had elected
to stay away from work. This presumes, of course,
that Judge Elton was under a great deal of stress at
the time of his death, which is not borne out by the
record, since the evidence shows that Judge Elton
was taking considerable time off from work immediately prior to his death on May 13, 1970. Moreover,
from the time actually spent in court, the cases which
Judge Elton was handling at the time of his death do
not appear to have been of the magnitude claimed by
the plaintiff. Therefore, it is seen that there was nothing accidental about Judge Elton's death because
there was neither an accidental event which caused
his death nor an unforeseen or unexpected result
from an act which Leonard Elton voluntarily undertook prior to his death.
POINT III.
EVEN IF JUDGE ELTON'S DEATH WAS "ACCIDENTAL," RECOVERY MUST BE DENIED
BECAUSE DISEASE, NOT ACCIDENT, WAS
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THE PREDOMINANT CAUSE OF HIS DEATH

In Tomaiiwli v. United States Fidelity And
Guaranty Company, 75 N.J. Super. 192, 182 A.2d
582, the insured was covered under apolicy protecting
against "loss resulting directly and independently of
all other causes from accidental bodily injuries.... "
Id. at 584. The policy also contained a clause providing that:
This policy does not cover any accident or
loss caused or contributed to by ...
( 3) disease, or medical or surgical treatment therefor, or bacterial infections (except
pus-forming infections occurring through an
accidental cut or wound) ... Id. at 584.
The decedent was involved in a minor automobile accident in which no one was injured, but he became extremely emotionally ups~t, slipped and fell
and died of a heart attack. The plaintiff sued on the
theory that the automobile accident caused the heart
attack and, therefore, the insured died from accidental bodily injuries. In affirming the trial
court's decision for the defendant, the court
relied on the language requiring that the death
occur "directly and independently of all other
causes." Id. at 588. The court reviewed the New Jersey decisions on this question and concluded that the
insured could not recover when an accident combined
with an active, progressive disease and caused the
insured's death; however, the insured could recover
if the accident triggered a latent inactive disease and
thereby caused the insured's death.
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The court answered the plaintiff's contention
that this construction made the policy meaningless by
stating:
... Oommon sense dictates that no reasonable person at age 72 suffering from arteriosclerotic heart disease complicated by an aneurysm and diabetes would expect to be found insurable for life insurance purposes, and that
if under any circumstances he was able to obtain for $31 a year an insurance policy which
contained a death benefit of $10,000, he would
know that the benefit would be limited to a coverage area of extremely small compass....
Yet, the scope of coverage here was not so
limited that a court should say that decedent
received little or nothing for his money. There
are many situations which would have required payment of the benefit by the company not
withstanding the insured's physical infirmities; for example, a suddenly fatal airplane,
highway, rail, steamship, or household accident, in which other persons lost their lives or
were severely injured, or an accident not immediately fatal but involving the inflicting of
bodily injuries on the assured from which he
would probably have died, even if prior thereto he had been in a perfect state of health. It
was with a view to such occurrences, or the
like, that the pa:rties bargained." Id. at 590
(Emphasis in original)
In Herthel v. Time Insurance Company, 221
Wis. 208, 265 N.W. 575 (1936), in which the court
described the insurance policy by saying:
The coverage clause of the policy in suit
was somewhat broader than those commonly
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involved in the adjudicated cases, and insured
against loss from death resulting from ''personal bodily injury ... effected directly and
independently of all other causes through accidental means, . . ." The phrases "through
external violence" and "directly or indirectly"
commonly used in accident policies, do not occur in the clause. Id. at 576.
The insured died from a heart attack which occurred while he was pulling a boat up onto the beach.
In reversing the trial Court's verdict for the plaintiff
and ordering the complaint dismissed, the court said:
... From the great majority of those cases
and upon reason, the general rule seems fairly
deducible that, if a disease or bodily condition exists and an accident occurs, to constitute
the accidental means the sole cause of an injury, under policies like the one in suit, it is not
necessary that the injury or the results thereof
would have been as severe as they were had the
disease or bodily condition not existed; but it
is sufficient ilf the accidental means would
have solely caused some considerable injury
had the disease or bodily condition not existed.
But, if no considerable injury at all would have
resulted had the insured not been afflicted
with the existing disease or condition, the accidental means cannot be considered as the sole
cause of the injury. Id. at 577-78
This rule was also followed in Alessandro v. Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co., 42 Cal. Rptr. 630
( 1965) , in which a policy provided benefits for total
disability caused by ''accidental bodily injury." Id.
at 631. The policy also included benefits for sickness
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to which the insured was not entitled. The insured
had a history of degenerative disease of his spinal
discs and injured his back while leaning forward to
work on an air con di ti oner. In affirming the trial
court's verdict for the insurer, the court said:
If rw considerable injury at all would have
resulted had the appellant not been afflicted
with the existing disease or con di ti on, then the
accident cou?d not be considered the proximate
cause of the harm, but rather the disease must
be so considered. Id. at 633. (Emphasis added)
This Court should take careful note of the fact
that this recent California decision was reached under policy language identical to Judge Elton's policy,
neither policy contained a disease exclusion or an "external and violent" requirement. The only policy language which the court relied on in Alessandro was the
phrase "accidental bodily injury." Under that language alone, the court reached the very logical conclusion that the accident itself must be capable of causing some harm before recovery will be allowed under
an accident policy.

In Murasky v. Commercial Travelers M11t1wl
Acc. Ass'n. of America, 94 F.2d 578 ( 1938), the court
said:
An inference or mere scintilla was not
enough to warrant the court below in the submission of the issue to the jury as to whether
he had a fall due solely to an accidental cause.
(Citations omitted) The rule ~a~ long_ been
established that where pre-existing disease
causes or contributes in causing death, there
44

can be no recovery and under such circumstances there is no issue for the jury. Id. 57980.
This rule is not inconsistent with the Utah law
on this question. The distinction between latent and
active disease is recognized in Lee v. New York Life
Insiirance Company, 95 Utah 445, 82 P.2d 178
(1938), in which the life insurance policy provided
double indemnity if death resulted "directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury
effected solely through external, violent and accidental causes ... " Id. at 446, 82 P.2d at 178. It also contained a clause excluding injury caused by disease.
The insured had a disease of the gall bladder which
was dormant until the tongue of a loaded trailer
struck him in the stomach, rupturing the gall bladder.
The infection released :from the ruptured gall bladder
caused his death, and the court held that the sole cause
of his death was the accident because the disease had
been dormant and was activated by the accident.
This distinction was also recognized in Tucker
v. New York Life Insurance Company, 107 Utah 478,
155 P.2d 173 ( 1945) which involved a policy identical to the one in Lee, supra. The insured had had high
blood pressure for one year before the accident. He fell
and broke his arm, aggravating his hypertension and
causing a weakened artery to burst. The court refused to allow double indemnity, saying that the disease
was active and worked with the accident to cause
death and that, therefore, the accident was not the sole
cause of death.
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All of the doctors who testified in this case
agreed that Judge Leonard Elton suffered a stroke
or died as a result of a cerebral thrombosis which
cut off the supply of blood to a vital area of his brain
and caused swelling shutting down the vital functions
of his body (R. 465, 329, 375, 431). All agreed that
the cerebral thrombosis or the clotting of the vessel
in Judge Elton's brain was in turn caused by the disease of arteriosclerosis (R. 375, 384, 342, 432, 465).
There was no dispute that this disease had progressed
to the point that, 16 years prior to his death, it had
caused a heart attack when an infarct occurred in one
of the vessels leading to the heart muscle. The
autopsy also revealed that, prior to his death, infarcts
had occurred in the spleen and kidney as well as the
brain. The progression of the disease is evidenced by
the increased number of episodes, starting with the
stroke experienced by Judge Elton in 1969 shortly before his death. Dr. Dalrymple recognized this as is
apparent from his testimony to the effect that from
the first time he saw Judge Elton in January of 1969
until the time he died, he never released the Judge
from his care. He was in the language of Dr. Dalrymple a sick man (R. 331). The doctor was afraid ,
because of Judge Elton's inherent personality that he
might have another stroke and was treating him with
the hoDe that he could prevent one (R. 355). He recognized that the factors which had caused the heart
attack prior to 1954, the infarc ts in the spleen and
kidneys prior to 1969, and the stroke of 1969 were
still present in Judge Elton's body and that he was
1
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likely to have another stroke in the future (R. 355).
The progression of the disease was also evident to lay
witnesses who observed the Judge from the time of
his stroke until the time of his death in 1970. The fact
that, from mid-April, 1970, he was tired (R. 207,
227, 239, 254, 261, 269, 276, 289), ashen in appearance and that his mind often wandered; that he
had dizzy spells ( R. 299, 300) and periods when he
lost his memory (R. 302) evidenced the mental and
physical deterioration which was taking place by reason of an inadequate blood supply (R. 346). All of the
doctors agreed that a condition of arteriosclerosis is
brought about by a metabolic defect which causes materials to be deposited upon the walls of the arteries
and that this is an inherited condition. (R. 429, 466,
324). All agree that given this condition, diet, lack of
exercise and smoking may be factors which affect but
do not cause the condition. (R. 335, 336, 430, 466).
There was a conflict of testimony as to whether the
type of stress which Leonard Elton was under at the
time of his death may be a factor which affects the
condition. Dr. Shelley Swift and Dr. Powell both testified that the type of stress which it is claimed Judge
Elton had at the time of his death would not and could
not cause arteriosclerosis and that the only type of
stress which could have brought about the death of
Leonard Elton would be that type of stress which
would produce psycho logic stress producing shock, like
loss of blood, burns, physical trauma or sharp rise in
blood pressure which produce a pathologic stress reaction. All doctors agreed that if stress is to have any47

thing to do with the cause of the basic condition, it
must exist over a period of time. Dr. Clyde Null describ this as chronic stress. Dr. Powell said stress sustained over a period of years probably play some role.
If we are to accept the testimony of Dr. Null, the stress
which it is claimed markedly aggravated the condition
of arteriosclerosis which Leonard Elton had was not
due to any accident or the nature of the work which
he was performing but by reason of inherent personality of Leonard Elton, he being what Dr. Null
described as a "type A individual," an aggressive,
hard working, striving individual. In other words,
stress over a period of years might have and probably
would have more effect on Leonard Elton than other
individuals, but this is just another way of saying that
Leonard Elton inherited a defect or, if you prefer,
an emotional defect which made him particularly
susceptible to the disease of arteriosclerosis. It
should be noted that the strokes or episodes which preceded Judge Elton's death occurred not during times
of emotional excitement but rather when he was resting or had been resting, which would be the time in
which his blood was traveling at the lowest rate and
clogging most likely to occur. Even if we accept the
plaintiff's thesis that the particular stress which
Judge Leonard Elton was under in the months preceding his death had something to do with his death, it
was, giving the plaintiff every benefit of the doubt,
only a contributing factor and not the moving, primary or proximate cause of his death. Nor does this
type of stress constitute an unexpected event, happen48

ing or accident inflicting bodily injury. It is, therefore, apparent that the plaintiff failed to prove under
any view of the evidence that Leonard Elton died as a
result of accidental bodily injury directly and independently of all other causes.
POINT IV.
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE CONTRADICTORY AND FAILED TO FAIRLY PRESENT THE ISSUES TO THE JURY TO THE
PREJUDICE OF THE DEFENDANT

The Instructions in this case were framed in
such a manner as to make it appear to the jury that if
Le'Onard Elton was working hard a:t the time of his
death and that this in some way contributed to or
hastened his death, plaintiff could recover under the
insurance policy with the defendant. This is particularly illustrated by the Court's Instruction No. 10,
which states:
You are instructed that if you believe by
a preponderance of the evidence that Leonard
W. Elton was suffering from a cardiovascular
disease, and that as a Judge he, at the time of
his death, was under unusual mental stress
and strain caused by an unusual amount of
work or work causing unusual mental stress
and strain, and that by chance, and without
design, consent or cooperation of Leonard W.
Elton, the stress or strain aggravated that disease and proximately caused a cerebral
thrombosis and that cerebral thrombosis under
those circumstances, was the injury which
proximately caused the death of Leonard W.
Elton, then your verdict should be in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant. (R.
80)
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This Instruction, especially when read in conjunction with the other Instructions which were given
by the Court, is erroneous in a number of respects. In
the first place, it fails to tell the jury that Judge Elton
had to die as a result of an accidental bodily injury
or the unforeseeable result df an intentional act, and
it attempts to identify mental stress and strain
caused by an unusual amount of work as an accident.
It further tells the jury that the stress or strain need
only contribute to the death of Leonard Elton in the
sense that it aggravated his cardiovascular disease
and does not tell them that the mental stress and
strain must be the moving, sole, and proximate cause
of the injury resulting in death. 'The only words attempting to define accident in this instruction are the
words "and that by chance, and without design, consent or cooperation of Leonard W. Elton" the unusual
mental stress and strain caused his death. This is compietely inadequate as a definition of '·'accident" under
the Utah law. "Accident" has little to do with the design, consent or cooperation of the insured. The critical issues are whether the event itself is accidental or
whether the injury was the foreseeable consequence
of the insured's acts. Nowhere in this Instruction is
·foreseeablity alluded to. Nor was the term "accidental
bodily injury" or "accident" ever defined by the Instructions. The closest they come to a definition was
in Instruction No. 9 which instucted the jury as follows:
You are instructed that accidents are of
two kinds; those that are not the result of hu50

man action and those that are such result.
Theref~re, an accident is an event which happen~ without any human agency, or, if happenmg through human agency, an event which
under the circumstances is unusual to and not
expected by the person to whom it happens.
(R. 79)
This Instruction simply tells the jury that there
are two kinds of accidents - those which are the result of human action and those which are not the result. The term "accident" implies some type of a happening or event and not just something unusual. At
no time was this brought out even though the defendant requested in its Requested Instruction No. 4,
which was denied, that the Oourt so instruct the jury.
Instruction No. 4 reads:
In order for the plaintiff to recover in this
action, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence tha:t the death of Leonard Elton on May 13, 1970, came about by reason of some unexpected event or occurrence
which in and of itselI and independently of
all other causes caused sufficient damage to
one of the organs of his body that he thereafter
died as a result of such event or occurrence and
injury. (R. 62)
The Court refused to admit the policy of insurance in evidence ( R. 38) . In fact, the Court told the
jury in Instruction No. 7 that the exact wording of
the policy was unimportant and refused to give the
defendant's Requested Instruction No. 3, which attempted to inform the jury on the type of policy which
was involved; to define the terms of the policy; and
to explain the circumstances under which the plain51

tiff might be entitled to recover the benefits of the
policy. In Instruction No. 8, the Court instructed the
jury : "You are instructed that a cerebral thrombosis
is a bodily injury." (R. 78). This is incorrect in that
the cerebral thrombosis in this case was not a bodily
injury, implying that the "accidental bodily injury"
which the case concerned might be proven simply by
proving that Leonard Elton died as a result of cerebral thrombosis, which was not the case. The accidental bodily injury which the case was concerned
with was that event or occurrence which brought
about the cerebral thrombosis and not the cerebral
thrombosis itself. The Court's Instruction No. 16 instructs the jury:
Where two causes combine to bring about
an injury and either one of them operating
alone would have been sufficient to cause the
injury, either cause is considered to be a proximate cause of the injury if it is a material element and was a substantial factor in bringing
it about. (R. 86)
As has been seen from the authorities in the foregoing part of the defendant's brief, it is not sufficient
for the plaintiff to merely prove that Leonard Elton
may have died either as a result of a pre-existing disease or as a result of an acidental bodily injury. She
had the burden under this policy of insurance of proving that the alleged accidental bodily injury caused
his death independently of other causes even though
it may have acted through a pre-existing condition in
doing so. In Instruction No. 12, the jury was in·
structed:
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You are instructed that it is no defense to this
action that a normal person would not have
died as a result of the injuries received and
also it is not a defense to this action that Leonard W. Elton at the time of his death was suffering from arteriosclerosis. ( R. 82)
This Instruction is incorrect when we consider
the question as to whether or not Leonard Elton died
as a result of the pre-existing disease or as a result
of the accident. If Leonard W. Elton at the time of
his death was suffering from arteriosclerosis to the
extent that the disease caused his death, although it
may have been contributed to by the stress,
ft is a defense that a normal person would not
have died as a result of this stress. In Instruction No.
17, the jury was instructed as follows, which should
be read in connection with Instruction No. 18, which
said:
INSTRUCTION NO. 17
You are instructed that negligence on the
part of Leonard W. Elton is not a defense in
this case and neither is voluntary exposure to
danger such a defense. The policy of insurance
here involved does not contain such a provision.
Unless the decedent intended to produce
the very result which occurred, to-wit, -his own
death the element of danger is both unimportant ~nd imma:terial. (R. 87)
INSTRUCTION NO. 18
You are instructed that whether or not
Leonard W. Elton used good or bad judgment
in connection with the amount of stress and
strain to which he subjected himself prior to
his death is immaterial. In this connection, if
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you should find in accordance with these instructions that Leonard W. Elton suffered an
accidental bodily injury as a result of unusual
stress and strain which shortened his life it
would be no defense, even if it were the fact,
that he exercised bad judgment in subjecting
himself to said stress and strain, if any. (R.
88)
We agree that under Utah law an accident may
follow as a result of an intended or voluntary act
when the results of that act are not the natural or
probable result of the act itself. But what the Court
has instructed the jury in Instruction Nos. 17 and 18
is that if Leonard Elton knew that by continuing to
work he might thereby hasten his own death, which
well he might have known if we believe the testimony
of Dr. Dalrymple, but nevertheless continued to work,
the plaintiff may recover. It is hard to conceive how
it can be said that Leonard W. Elton died as a result
of an accident. If he knew, or reasonably should have
known that if he continued to work he would
die and yet he voluntarily continued to do so.
These Instructions had no place in this lawsuit.
As pointed out by the Kellogg case, supra, the test of
foreseeability is not whether Leonard Elton could
foresee his own death but whether or not in light of
his physical condition his death was reasonably foreseeable by reason of the disease from which he was
suffering. However, as given, they allow the plaintiff
in this case to recover even though his death could
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have been reasonably foreseen by Leonard Elton or
anyone if he continued to work, which is clearly not
the law.
We are convinced that the jury in this case had
no idea of the type of policy on which this action was
brought or the circumstances under which the plaintiff was permitted to recover. They were not told
about the policy by the Court. The net effect of what
they were told was simply that if they found Leonard
Elton was doing an unusual amount of work, causing
an unusual amount of mental stress and strain, and
that this somehow contributed to his death, the plaintiff was entitled to recover. This was clearly prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
In spite of the plaintiff's claims and attempts to
characterize the defendant's policy as a special risk
policy, it is apparent that the policy involved in this
case, although it may have been more liberal than
other accident policies, was clearly a policy insuring
the beneficiaries of Leonard Elton in the event he
died as a result of an accidental bodily injury. It is
submitted that the plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of proof for the reason that as a matter of law
there was nothing accidental or unforeseeable or unexpected about Leonard Elton's death on May 13,
1970. There was no accidental event or happening
which brought it about. And even if we under some
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kind of a strange construction attempted to define the
stress and strain Leonard Elton may have been under
immedately prior to the time of his dea:th as an accidental event or happening, recovery must still be denied because this stress and strain was not the predominant cause of his death. As demonstrated by the
evidence, Leonard Elton died by reason of the natural
progression of the disease of arteriosclerosis. That
disease had progressed to the point where it had produced a heart attack sixteen years before his death.

It is not surprising that the jury returned averdict in favor of the plaintiff in this case in view of the
Instructions of the Court. They had no idea of the
type of insurance policy involved in this action. Under
those Instructions the only elements which they had
to find were that Leonard W. Elton was working
hard at the time of his death and the fact that he was
working played some role in his death on May 13,
1970.

It is submitted that under the law and the evidence in this case the Oourt should have granted the
defendant's Motion for a Directed Verdict and dismissed the plaintiff's action and that this Court
should reverse the trial court and direct that this case
be dismissed. If we have failed to convince the Court
of this, it at least appears that the issues in this case
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were not fairly presented to the jury by the Court
and that the verdict of the jury in this case should be
set aside and the case returned to the District Court
for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
DON J. HANSON
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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